Sexual integration of combat forces presents underappreciated challenges. Sex differences in physical capacity remain important in modern warfare, and the sexes also differ in combat-relevant psychological traits, including risk taking and aggressiveness. Moreover, group dynamics have consequences for unit cohesion and combat performance. Men more easily participate in coalitions organized to mete out violence, a tendency enhanced in the presence of intergroup competition. Men's coalitions require lower levels of investment and can persist for longer in the face of withingroup conflict than women's coalitions. Combat units rely on cohesion to enable performance, and introduction of women tends to reduce cohesion because, among other reasons, men often find it difficult to trust women. The attributes that soldiers value in comrades are ones that would have been important for primitive warriors, including strength, physical courage, and other aspects of masculinity, which may mean that women cannot evoke trust in their male comrades the way other men can.
Introduction
Th roughout the ages, participation in violent intergroup confl ict has been overwhelmingly the province of men. No modern society signifi cantly relies, and virtually no premodern society relied, on women as combat soldiers. Not only is warfare a male occupation, in many ways it has been viewed as the quintessential "manly" pursuit. Unlike, say, the manufacture of musical instruments-a task that also tends cross-culturally to be performed by men (D'Andrade, 1966 )-warfare has often been the defi ning feature of masculinity for a culture. In many primitive societies, for example, a male was not entitled to full status as a man until he distinguished himself in warfare, usually by killing an enemy (Turney-High, 1971, p. 161) . Moreover, women were often among the "spoils" of primitive warfare and sometimes one of its primary goals (Chagnon, 1988) .
Just as warfare has been associated with men, peace has been associated with women. Although the Shoshone girl Sacagawea is often erroneously referred to as Lewis and Clark's "guide," her most signifi cant contribution to that epic journey was that her presence, in William Clark's words, "reconsiles all the Indians, as to our friendly intentions [because] a woman with a party of men is a token of peace" (Lewis & Clark, 1814 /1904 , entry of Oct. 13, 1805 . Similarly, Australian prospector Michael Leahy recalled the relief he felt when fi rst contacting the highlanders of New Guinea in the early 1920s, when it appeared that the armed men were accompanied by women, leading his lowland native guide to assure him that there would be no fi ght (Connolly & Anderson, 1987, p. 24) . Th us, it is not only a consistent pattern that men engage in warfare but also that Violence, Homicide, and War (2012) (Part of the Oxford Library of Psychology Series) browne women do not (Brightman, 1996) . Th is pattern parallels the exclusion of women from big-game hunting, as exemplifi ed by the !Kung, who "believe that femaleness weakens the hunters' prowess and endangers his chance of success" (Marshall, 1976, p. 96) . Many modern nations are now adopting policies that attempt to overturn the long-standing link between men and warfare. Some countries, such as Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands, have eliminated all bars to women serving in combat, though there have been few takers in those volunteer militaries (Browne, 2007a, p. 268) . Others, such as the United States and Britain, have opened many formerly closed combat positions to women, while maintaining a ban on women in off ensive ground combat, although even this exclusion has been subjected to heavy criticism (e.g., Solaro, 2006) . Th e question is not, as some would have it, whether women can be good soldiers; they clearly can be and have been in large numbers. Th e real question is whether in the contemporary military they can be eff ective warriors, that is, people who possess "a strong individual existential commitment to combat" (Henriksen, 2007, p. 206) and enhance the eff ectiveness of their units.
A variety of assumptions underlie initiatives to expand women's combat opportunities. One is that exclusion of women really never made sense; it was based on the assumption that because many women lacked the physical and emotional wherewithal to engage in combat, all women should be excluded. Underlying this view is the notion that there is really nothing inherently "masculine" about war-that the association between men and warfare is mere happenstance-and that warfare neither calls for nor rewards masculinity. One feminist professor, for example, has found it diffi cult "to pinpoint why it is that the army is more male than the university" (Addis, 1994, p. 17) . Another perception is that although the historic reliance on men in combat may have made sense in the past, changes in the nature of warfare have transformed warfare from a contest of brawn into one of brains, rendering the sexes interchangeable in combat (Addis, Russo, & Sebesta, 1994, p. xv; De Groot, 1995, p. 259) . Under this view, the primary obstacle to integration today is outdated sexist attitudes that cause men to resist inclusion of women into the "band of brothers." Th ese attitudes, it is argued, can be overcome by proper leadership and training (Harrell & Miller, 1997, p. 99) .
Th e primary purpose of this chapter is to show that these assumptions are fl awed. First, the sexes diff er on an array of combat-related physical and psychological dimensions. Th e most obvious, and least controversial, diff erences are physical. Despite claims to the contrary, these diff erences remain relevant, because modern combat continues to impose serious physical challenges (Browne, 2007a, pp. 59-72) . Second, the assumption that men and women are largely identical in combat-relevant traits other than physical strength overlooks a vast literature on psychological sex diff erences. Many traits in which the sexes diff er are critical to combat personnel, including physical aggressiveness, willingness to kill strangers at close range, and willingness to expose oneself to physical risk. On the other hand, nurturance and empathy, which are more characteristic of women, can interfere with combat performance. Some of these traits are diffi cult to measure meaningfully in advance of actual combat, and although there is overlap between the sexes on all of them, there is a serious question about whether there is enough to justify inclusion of women.
Finally, and more important, however, is the fact that irrespective of the characteristics of an individual woman, she is still a woman, and the fact of her sex by itself can have an array of eff ects on her unit's performance. Eff ective combat units are cohesive, and introduction of women can interfere with cohesion even if individual women possess the traditional warrior attributes. Moreover, men seem less inclined to trust women in dangerous situations. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, inclusion of women can also have adverse eff ects as a consequence of sexual competition and other sexual tensions, in addition to factors such as men's tendency to protect women, potential rape of captured women, and eff ects of women's reproductive role, such as pregnancy, menstruation, and motherhood (especially single motherhood) (Browne, 2007a) .
Combat-Related Physical and Psychological Sex Diff erences
Th e fi rst set of sex diff erences consists of individually measurable traits. Some of these diff erences are important in their own right, and they can also aff ect group dynamics in a number of ways described later. Although some can be eff ectively measured in advance, others cannot. not to mention height, weight, and bone mass (Browne, 2007a, pp. 19-27) . Although the magnitude of the sex diff erence varies from trait to trait, there is very little overlap between the sexes on some of them, such as upper-body strength (Pheasant, 1983) . Th e probability that a man selected at random from the population will have greater upper-body strength than a randomly selected woman typically ranges between 95% and 99%, depending upon the sample and the measure employed. Many of these diff erences are observable in children and increase with puberty (Th omas & French, 1985) . Th is male physical advantage refl ects a common primate, even mammalian, pattern. In most such species, sexual dimorphism in size and strength is an evolutionary consequence of male-male competition (Plavcan & Van Schaik, 1997) , and as will be seen later, this dimorphism is coupled with psychological adaptations facilitating intrasexual competition.
Th e need for strength and endurance in modern combat has not disappeared. In fact, the infantry soldier of today carries more gear than his World War II counterpart (Scales, 2005) . Although most soldiers will not engage in hand-to-hand combat, which relies primarily on upper-body strength, some still do, and such combat is the last resort of all warriors-whether infantry rifl emen, tank drivers, or downed fi ghter pilots attempting to resist capture or to escape (McConnell, 1985) -and even of those occupying support positions. Many other combat tasks require strength, as well, including lifting of heavy artillery shells, damage-control tasks on a warship, carrying a machine gun, or digging fi ghting holes. Because combat is physically arduous and must be sustained in adverse conditions, knowing how to perform a task and being able to perform it in training are not enough. Although Israeli women serve as tank instructors, for example, they are not eligible for combat assignments in the Armored Corps because they lack the endurance to load heavy shells for extended periods (Schechter, 2004) . Even if one's assigned job is not physically demanding, combat may render it so. If a ship is struck by a missile, all hands may have to turn to the tasks of damage control, such as fi re fi ghting, fl ood limitation, and evacuation of the wounded. Th e diff erence between a ship's sinking and staying afl oat may turn on the crew's ability to sustain such intense physical activity (Peniston, 2006, pp. 150-151, 156) .
Women who would serve in combat would not be randomly selected, and self-selection would ensure that women who volunteered would be more male-like than average. Self-selection has only limited eff ects, however. A 2002 British Ministry of Defence study found that only about one-tenth of 1% of female recruits and 1% of trained female soldiers could satisfy the physical standards for infantry and armor (Ministry of Defence, 2002, p. B-5) . Similarly, a study by the US Navy found that although virtually all male sailors could meet the standards for critical damage-control tasks, most women could not (Presidential Commission, 1992, p. 74) . Th e very diff erent physical-fi tness standards that the military sets for the two sexes refl ect its recognition of these large sex diff erences. For example, 18-year-old females in the US Army are required to do only about one-third the number of push-ups as 18-year-old males and are allowed more time to run 2 miles than 41-year-old men (Vanden Brook, 2006) .
Finally, the sexes diff er in their tolerance for pain. A major review of pain studies found average eff ect sizes of between 0.5 and 0.6 for both pain threshold (the level at which a stimulus is perceived as painful) and pain tolerance (the level at which pain is no longer bearable) (Riley, Robinson, Wise, Myers, & Fillingim, 1998) . Th e importance of a soldier's ability to endure physical pain scarcely requires mention. A wounded soldier must sometimes continue to fi ght despite his wounds, and the more pain he is experiencing, the less able he is to fi ght.
In some respects, physical sex diff erences present the easiest challenge for sexual integration, because sex-neutral physical tests could, in principle, be used to screen applicants, although rigorous standards would exclude most women. As we will see later, however, psychological sex diff erences create more diffi cult issues.
Psychological Sex Diff erences
Th e sexes diff er on average in a variety of psychological attributes, including risk taking, physical aggression, fear, and empathy. Many of these diff erences are observable early in childhood and increase substantially at the time of puberty. Like physical sex diff erences, these psychological diff erences may have substantial impact on combat performance.
Risk Taking
One of the largest sex diff erences is in risk-taking behavior, especially with respect to physical risks, with the diff erence peaking in young adulthood (Wilson & Daly, 1985) . Although in most laboratory studies, sex diff erences are only moderate (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) , in naturalistic browne settings, the diff erences are stark, whether in highrisk employment, recreation, or simply "lifestyle." In the workplace, for example, men are overwhelmingly represented in risky employment, with well over 90% of workplaces deaths in the United States being males (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003) . In a meta-analysis of sex diff erences in risk taking, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) concluded that "males took risks even when it was clear that it was a bad idea," while females seemed "disinclined to take risks even in fairly innocuous situations or when it was a good idea to take a risk" (p. 378). Th is fi nding is signifi cant for military risk taking, because many militarily appropriate risks are, from a personal perspective, a "bad idea," even if they are a good idea from an institutional perspective. Th e sexes also diff er in the eff ect of emotions on their risk-taking behavior, as anger increases risk taking among men but does not do so for women, while disgust inhibits risk taking among women, but it does not for men (Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson, 2004) , eff ects that would be predicted to infl uence combat behavior.
Fear
Risk taking and fear are intimately related, as the latter tends to inhibit the former. Females from childhood through adulthood experience higher levels of fear than males (McLean & Anderson, 2009) . Indeed, sex diff erences in expression of fear are observable even in infancy (Nagy et al., 2001) , and they increase into adulthood (Gullone & King, 1997) . Sex diff erences in fear and risk perception have two components. Women are more likely than men to perceive risk, and even when they perceive the same level of risk as men, they have higher levels of fear about the risk. For example, notwithstanding the fact that women are less frequently victimized by violent crime, they are more fearful of it than men (Smith & Torstensson, 1997) , with women's fear being highest among those of peak reproductive age. Women's heightened fear of crime does not appear to be just a function of their special vulnerability to rape, as it extends to other crimes as well, such as murder-even though women are substantially less likely to be murdered than men-and to property crimes. When two snipers were terrorizing the Washington, D.C., area in 2002, women reported being substantially more likely than men to modify their behaviors, even though objectively there was a very low risk of harm and men made up more than two-thirds of the sniping victims (Zivotofsky & Koslowsky, 2005) . A study of male and female soldiers serving in support positions during the Gulf War, none of whom had seen combat, found that women reported experiencing signifi cantly more psychological stress than men, especially stress related to anticipation of combat (Rosen, Wright, Marlowe, Bartone, & Giff ord, 1999) . Women also suff er more from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a sex diff erence that is not entirely attributable to sex diff erences in sexual assault (Pratchett, Pelcovitz, & Yehuda, 2010) . Similarly, Israeli girls suff er more from PTSD than boys after terror attacks, a diff erence that is largely a result of their greater fear levels (Laufer & Solomon, 2009 ).
Physical Aggression
Th e sexes also diff er in their attitudes toward, and willingness to engage in, physical aggression. Like risk taking, sex diff erences in physical aggression appear early in development, being present from about 2 years of age. Fights among school children, for example, are overwhelmingly between boys (Boulton, 1993) . A meta-analysis of aggression studies found that the age group showing the largest sex diff erence is 18-21-year-olds (d = 0.66), followed closely by 22-30-year-olds (d = 0.60) (Archer, 2009) , the prime demographics for combat soldiers. As aggressive behavior becomes more dangerous, the sex diff erence in aggression increases. Th us, when criminal behavior is considered, which is typically not done in psychological studies of aggression, the sex diff erence is even more compelling. Between 1976 and 2004, almost 90% of convicted murderers in the United States were male (as were over three-quarters of their victims) (Fox & Zawitz, 2006) . In 2000, state and federal prisons held approximately 1.3 million inmates (US Department of Justice, 2003, p. v) , of whom 93% were male (and a greater proportion of male prisoners than female prisoners were serving time for violent off enses). Men not only engage in more physical forms of attack, they also have more positive attitudes toward aggression, being more likely to view it as an acceptable way of achieving one's ends and experiencing less guilt and anxiety about engaging in aggression than women do (Campbell & Muncer, 1994) .
Empathy and Nurturance
Although perhaps not as obvious as the case with traits such as risk taking and aggression, sex diff erences in empathy and nurturance are also relevant to combat service. Th e psychological process of "pseudo-speciation" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1979, pp. 122-125) , which allows-or even encouragessoldiers to kill, is the antithesis of compassion and sensitivity. Indeed, it is a mechanism that precludes empathy, for only by categorizing the enemy as someone not entitled to a full measure of compassion is it possible for most people to kill without experiencing the guilt that usually follows the killing of another human being. A high degree of empathy not only engenders a reluctance to kill, it also increases the psychological cost of killing if that reluctance is overcome. Having engaged in conduct inconsistent with their personal natures, many soldiers have a diffi cult time living with what they have done and in extreme cases suff ering from PTSD (Kilner, 2002) .
From childhood, girls engage in more nurturing behavior than boys, and in all societies, women engage in overwhelmingly more parental care than men (Hewlett, 1988) . Women also score higher on most measures of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) , which may be responsible for the heightened guilt and anxiety that women feel about acting aggressively (Archer, 2004) . Th e sexes also diff er in the circumstances that attenuate empathy. A study comparing empathic responses of men and women using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain found that although both sexes showed activation in areas of the brain that respond to their own pain and to observation of pain in others when "innocent" people were electrically shocked, when someone who "deserved" harm (in the study, someone who had played a game unfairly) was shocked, the empathic response of men, but not of women, was substantially reduced (Singer et al., 2006) . On the other hand, areas of the brain associated with reward processing showed enhanced activation in men, but not women, when the "deserving" player was shocked. Th ese fi ndings suggest that men's empathy may be more easily "switched off " than women's and that men may derive greater satisfaction from at least some sorts of physical revenge.
Th e fact that women are likely to feel greater empathy for the enemy (and more fear) than men is consistent with reports from Iraq suggesting that women are suff ering PTSD at a substantially higher rate and of a more serious nature than men (Scharnberg, 2005) , despite the fact that they are exposed to substantially less combat danger. Th us, women may be less likely than men to kill and more likely to pay a heavy psychological cost for it when they do.
Studies May Underestimate the Magnitude of Sex Diff erences
Sex diff erences in individual traits such as risk taking, fear, aggressiveness, dominance, and empathy are substantial, but there is signifi cant overlap between the sexes in many of these traits. Psychological studies may underestimate the magnitude of the relevant sex diff erences, however. One reason is that the traits, though often correlated, are not perfectly so, meaning that the sex imbalance among those possessing substantial amounts of all of the relevant traits would be greater than for any one trait. As Del Giudice (2009) has shown, simultaneous measurement of multidimensional constructs will often yield eff ects much larger than the average of the unidimensional separate eff ects.
Another reason that the magnitude of sex eff ects may be underestimated is that the relevant emotions may not have been activated. It is one thing to ask city dwellers whether they would be willing to spend a night in the woods in grizzly-bear country; it is quite another thing to put them in a bear-fi lled forest and observe their physiological, emotional, and behavioral responses, or to determine whether they have voluntarily placed themselves in such positions. Th us, measures of observed behaviors tend to reveal larger eff ects than paper-and-pencil trait measures or even self-reports (Archer, 2004; Byrnes et al., 1999) . Moreover, some sex diff erences, such as those in risk taking, are enhanced in group settings (Ronay & Kim, 2006) , despite usually being measured in individual settings.
Examining people's actual physically risky behavior is likely to provide a more accurate view of relevant sex diff erences than laboratory studies. One real-world demonstration of men's greater risk-taking propensity comes from the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, which bestows awards for heroism. Johnson (1996) found that 92% of the recognized acts of heroism from 1989 through 1995 were performed by men. Th ere was also a signifi cant diff erence in the benefi ciaries of the heroism: Over half of those rescued by women were known to the rescuer, while over two-thirds of those rescued by men were strangers. Similar results were obtained in a study of rescues in the United Kingdom, with over 94% of rescuers being male, and a majority of those rescued by men being strangers compared to less than 20% for women (Lyons, 2005) . Th e same pattern is exhibited in the awarding of the United States Lifesaving Association's (USLA) Medal of Valor, which is presented to professional lifeguards who browne have risked their lives to an extraordinary degree, with all 35 of the medals bestowed through 2008 having been awarded to men (USLA, n.d.) . Th e USLA also bestows its Heroic Act Award on nonlifeguards who have risked their lives to an extraordinary degree in a rescue or attempted rescue of an unrelated person, with 38 of 48 such awards having been given to men (and 7 of the women given awards were among 16 collegiate sailors in 2002 who had engaged in a single rescue, with the awards being granted for their collective eff orts rather than for individual actions) (USLA, n.d.; International Sailing Federation, 2002) .
A subset of the Carnegie awards may be even more telling on the subject of sex diff erences. Most of the Carnegie awards examined by Johnson involved nonaggressive actions, such as rescuing a victim from fi re or drowning. More relevant to the combat question are situations in which there is not only a substantial risk of death or serious injury but also a need to confront physically violent people. So, who are the people who foil robberies, chase down purse snatchers and carjackers, and rescue others from criminal assaults? Th e Carnegie awards suggest that it is men who are the principal protectors of crime victims. Between 1998 and July 2006, over 90% of the almost 800 awards went to males (Browne, 2007a, pp. 35-36) . Eighty-two of the awards went to people responding to an assault, and the pattern there is revealing. First, men were much more likely to engage the assailant physically. Of the 47 rescuers responding to an assailant armed with a gun, 5 were women, but none of these women physically engaged the assailant, whereas 35 of the 42 male rescuers did. Second, men were much more likely to sustain fatal injuries in the process. Ten rescuers were killed while aiding assault victims, all of them men. Th ird, men were much more likely to intervene to protect a stranger. Only 40% of the women were rescuing strangers, compared to 90% of the men. Another study specifi cally focusing on individuals who intervened to thwart violent crimes, such as muggings, armed robberies, and bank holdups, found that only 1 of 32 rescuers in the sample was female (Huston, Ruggiero, Conner, & Geis, 1981) . Becker and Eagly (2004) have argued that the Carnegie awards provide a skewed view of the true sex distribution of heroes. Th ey argue that the association of heroic behavior with men refl ects a failure to appreciate women's heroic behavior. Heroic behavior, they say, has two components:
It is both risky and prosocial. Th ey acknowledge that men are generally more inclined to engage in risky behaviors, but they argue that women are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors, so these two tendencies might be expected to cancel each other out in producing the sex distribution of heroes. Th e heroic acts of Carnegie medal recipients count as heroic, they argue, but so, too, do a number of other behaviors that women are as likely-or even more likely-to engage in. Th ey examined data from the "Righteous Among the Nations," which recognizes non-Jews who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust. Th ey found that in Poland, the Netherlands, and France, men and women were roughly equally likely to be listed, although if married couples were excluded-because of uncertainty about whether the husband and wife were equally involved in the activity-women predominated.
It is unclear whether the Holocaust study taps into behaviors that are strongly implicated in daring physical exploits, such as combat service. Certainly, assisting Jews was risky business, although the point of the activity was avoiding detection rather than engaging in violent confrontation. It is also diffi cult to draw any inferences about global sex diff erences in heroic behaviors (or the lack thereof ) from this sample without knowing what the men were doing while the women were aiding Jews. In all three countries studied, there was an active resistance against the Nazis. Members of the resistance-who were predominantly male-engaged in a variety of behaviors, including attacks on the enemy, sabotage, acquisition and transmission of intelligence, distribution of underground newspapers, organizing strikes, as well as providing shelter not only to Jews but also to Allied soldiers and downed airmen. Moreover, presumably many of the husbands of the women who were listed were serving in the military (or dead). When all of these activities are cumulated, it is likely that there was a strong disproportion of men involved. Th us, Becker and Eagly's conclusion (p. 173) that "women made heroic choices at least as often as men" is possible only by carving out one particular facet of resistance to the Nazis, notably one that was carried on surreptitiously and primarily in the home. Although Becker and Eagly express hope that their research will produce a "cultural shift whereby heroism will be viewed as more androgynous" (p. 175), their data do not establish that such a shift is warranted.
Individual Sex Diff erences and Combat Motivation
Th e aforementioned traits-risk taking, fear, physical aggressiveness, and empathy-all show substantial sex diff erences, and all are related in one way or another to combat motivation. Obviously, combat demands risk taking, willingness to engage in physical aggression, and suffi cient depersonalization of the enemy to allow his killing. Empathy may aff ect combat motivation by inhibiting the willingness to kill, and men's diminished empathy for those who "deserve" punishment may enhance their willingness to kill the enemy. Moreover, the strength of the mother-infant bond seems to make the long deployments sometimes required by military service more diffi cult for mothers than for fathers (Browne, 2007a, pp. 255-256) . In addition to causing greater psychological pain for women, this may also undermine their performance.
Th e fear that is ever present on the battlefi eld also aff ects combat performance, but its impact is complex, because soldiers face an array of fears in battle. Th e most obvious of these fears are of death and serious injury. Such fears are negatively motivating, and women's greater fear of physical harm predictably would result in a greater reduction in motivation to fi ght. As Campbell (1999) has shown, women have evolved to act as though they see less potential gain and more potential loss than men do from exposing themselves to physical risks.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, fear of death and injury are not necessarily the greatest fears that men face in combat. Rather, men's greatest fear going into battle, especially men going into battle for the fi rst time, is that they will show themselves to be cowards (Dollard, 1944, pp. 18-19) . Commenting on the American soldier in World War II, Stouff er and colleagues noted that combat is a "dare," and "one never knew for sure that he could take it until he had demonstrated that he could" (Stouff er et al., 1949, pp. 131-132) . Showing cowardice in battle brought not just censure for cowardice itself; even more powerfully, "to fail to measure up as a soldier in courage and endurance was to risk the charge of not being a man."
Why do so many men fear cowardice even more than their own deaths? Primarily because of the "desire to appear a man amongst men," and battle is the "acid test." As Holmes (1985, pp. 142-143) puts it, "there are occasions when this desire to preserve status is quite literally stronger than the fear of death." Th e "status" that the soldier seeks is not a hierarchical status-in fact, it is unrelated to formal military rank-but rather a kind of "membership" status. Unlike other situations in which men compete against each other for top positions, as in tribal or corporate politics (see Browne, 2002) , men in combat units seek acceptance into the "band of brothers"; they seek acknowledgment of other men that they are valuable coalition partners. As Keegan (1993, p. 226 ) observed of the soldier, "It is the admiration of other soldiers that satisfi es him-if he can win it."
Fear of not measuring up as a man, unlike fear of death or injury, is positively motivating, because it causes men to engage in behaviors that might hasten their death. Because women do not feel a man's need to be considered a "man among men," they are likely to be less inclined to expose themselves to the risk of death to achieve that respect. Th ey may be motivated by a desire not to be labeled cowards, but that probably tends to be a relatively weak motivation for women, since to label a woman a "coward" is far less insulting than labeling a man one. Indeed, one seldom hears that label being attached to a woman. Th e dictionary defi nes "coward" as "one who shows disgraceful fear or timidity" (MerriamWebster, 2005 ). We do not decline to label women cowards because they do not display fear or timidity but rather because we do not fi nd women's fear or timidity disgraceful. Th us, the reluctance to label women cowards arises not because women are physically braver than men but because they are not and are not expected to be, a phenomenon captured by Aristotle's observation that "a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman" (Aristotle, 2000, p. 109) . Th e reduced expectation of women's courage raises an additional problem, which is that because of the strong equality norms in combat units, the failure to expect much courage from female soldiers may have the eff ect of defi ning bravery down for all (Browne, 2007a, pp. 108-111) .
In theory, average sex diff erences could be dealt with through improvements in personnel selection. As discussed previously, the physical disparity between men and women could be rendered largely irrelevant by the imposition of rigorous sex-neutral physical standards. Selection criteria might also be identifi ed that would, on a wholesale basis, attempt to distinguish individuals who would also possess the requisite combination of risk taking, physical aggressiveness, and courage that would allow them to be lions in combat. Th us could a small cohort of women be created who were as physically and psychologically suited to ground combat as their male comrades. browne Reality is diff erent from theory, however. One of the truisms of combat is that it is never known before the shooting starts who will perform well and who will not (Marshall, 1947, p. 61; Richardson, 1978, p. 95) . Good performance in training often does not translate to good performance in combat, and people who perform poorly in training may turn out to be masters of the battlefi eld. Moreover, no matter how accurate individual selection criteria might be made, there is another, more diffi cult problem: No matter what the individual attributes of a female warrior, she is still a woman, and her femaleness may aff ect a unit's eff ectiveness in a variety of ways, a problem obscured by an atomistic focus on individual traits. As we will see later, these group dynamics raise serious doubts about whether women can be fully integrated into male combat groups.
Diff erences in Single-Sex and Mixed-Sex Groups
Group dynamics are critical in combat, as a vast literature on combat motivation shows. Men fi ght for many reasons, but if any reason could be labeled primary, it is that they fi ght for their comrades with whom they have bonded. Th is bond-often characterized as "male bonding (Tiger, 1969) -is a powerful one. In addition to the "horizontal cohesion" that connects the "band of brothers" is the "vertical cohesion" between leaders and subordinates. Th e prospect of integration raises a number of questions that are critical to combat eff ectiveness. Do men have an innate predisposition to resist introduction of women into certain all-male groups even if the women possess as much strength, aggressiveness, and inclination to take risks as many men? Or, if men lack an inclination to actively resist their introduction, do they also lack the psychological mechanisms that will affi rmatively facilitate inclusion of women in combat groups? Moreover, if women are eligible to be combat soldiers, they will also be eligible to be combat leaders, leading to the question of whether men are as inclined to follow a woman into battle as they are another man. It may be that for very fundamental reasons women do not evoke in men the same feelings of comradeship and "followership" that men do. Although the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) view is that men and women, and male, female, and mixed-sex groups, are diff erent only because of social learning, there is substantial reason to believe that something more fundamental is at play.
Male Coalitionary Psychology: Th e "Male Warrior Hypothesis"
All-male groups are common throughout the world-whether secret societies, warrior groups, street gangs, sports teams, or college fraternities. Th ey are often involved with the use of force, which is virtually a male monopoly. Intergroup hostility and competition in humans occurs primarily between groups of men and can be activated (among men but not women) by even subtle cues of intergroup confl ict (Yuki & Yokota, 2009) , and in public-goods games, men, but not women, increase their group contribution when intergroup competition is activated (Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007) . Whereas women tend to form their identity based upon their relationships with other individuals, men are more likely to form their identity based upon the group (sports team, fraternity, etc.) to which they belong and are more likely to engage in costly sacrifi ce for their group (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999) .
Where does this tendency of men to band together in circumstances of intergroup competition come from? It seems likely that our species' history of "frequent and violent intergroup confl ict has shaped the social psychology and behavior of men in general" (Van Vugt et al., 2007) . Th e "malewarrior hypothesis" of Van Vugt and colleagues posits that men possess a psychology that makes them more likely to engage in coalitionary behavior and intergroup rivalry than women, because of the reproductive benefi ts that coalition membership brought to ancestral males involved in confl icts with outgroups.
Sex diff erences in group behavior are observable even in children and suggest a phylogenetic history of such diff erences. A principal function of play in both humans and nonhumans is to prepare the individual for the challenges of adulthood (Parker, 1984) . Th e spontaneous aggregation of boys into all-male groups, as well as the play hunting and fi ghting that these groups engage in-even when discouraged by adults-performs such a function in boys, just as play child care seems to for girls. By age 6, boys, but not girls, spontaneously form multichild groups, and much of their play takes place in such groups (Benenson, Apostoleris, & Parnass, 1997) . Boys obtain substantial emotional rewards from this group play, despite its rough and dominanceoriented nature (Martin & Fabes, 2001) , and the thrill-motivated risky play that children, especially boys, engage in seems to function to reduce anxiety associated with hazardous activities and allow them to master dangerous situations (Sandseter & Kennair, 2011) .
Th e tendency of boys to form coalitions in which they struggle for dominance is likely the result of an "evolved motivational disposition associated with coalitionary male-male competition" that prepares them for their traditional role (Geary, Byrd-Craven, Hoard, Vigil, & Numtee, 2003, p. 457) . Moreover, many of the specifi c behaviors involved in boys' play-running, throwing, and tracking projectiles-mirror skills important in primitive warfare. Th us, rough-and-tumble play in boys, including play fi ghting, serves the twin functions of providing experience in negotiation of dominance hierarchies and also in practicing specifi c behaviors useful in adulthood for engaging in intergroup competition. Most organized male sports also involve the strength (especially upper-body strength), speed, and throwing ability that would have been important in hunting and warfare (Lombardo, 2012) , and the greater sport "fandom" displayed by males is probably a byproduct of male coalitional psychology (Winegard & Deaner, 2010) .
Th e banding together of males into all-male groups is not simply a consequence of a "formalized hostility" to women but in large part due to a "positive valence" between men (Tiger, 1969, p. xii) . Consistent with the male warrior hypothesis, Tiger argued that men tend to bond most strongly in situations involving power, force, and dangerous work, and that they consciously and emotionally exclude females from these groups. Th ese interpersonal eff ects are visible in a variety of male groups, including soldiers, police, and fi refi ghters, and appear to be related to characteristic sex diff erences in group dynamics.
Sex Diff erences in Group Formation and Attachment
Males and females tend to self-organize intoand be most comfortable-in diff erent kinds of groups. Men's relationships tend to be broad, shallow, and activity centered, while women's tend to be narrow, deep, and emotion centered. Accordingly, despite the stereotype of greater female sociality, men report signifi cantly more close friends than women do (Vigil, 2007) , they are more tolerant of same-sex peers than women (Benenson et al., 2009) , and their friendships are more resistant to termination because of confl ict than female friendships (Benenson & Alavi, 2004) . Men have a lower threshold for creating large cooperative groups and can maintain them with lower levels of investment.
Th e fl ip side of that tendency explains the lack of persistence of the groups after their members physically separate, as male friendship tends to be "proximity and activity dependent" rather than "talk dependent," as female friendships are (Gurian, 1999, pp. 48-49) . Th is activity dependence led Gurian to characterize men's friendships as "fragile," yet it may be this very dynamic that allows the group bonding to occur in the fi rst place, and it may contribute to the widely held belief that the "bonding" that cements soldiers is in fact "male bonding." Male comradeship is sustained by proximity and shared tasks and experiences, and it is made stronger if the experience is a diffi cult and dangerous one (Gray, 1959, pp. 89-90) . A man's ability to work in a common endeavor with his comrades is not dependent upon his aff ection toward individual unit members, and male groups can be sustained even in the presence of internal confl ict. What is required among the members is not aff ection but trust.
Female relationships are fragile in a diff erent way from men's, as they are emotionally deeper but at the same time more subject to disruption by confl icts. As Geary and Flinn (2002) have observed, if male coalitions required the same level of investment as female groups, they could not be sustained at their often large size. Women have a lower threshold for confl ict and interpersonal slight (Vigil, 2007) , and they are more likely to form exclusionary alliances and ostracize members of the group (Benenson, Antonellis, Cotton, Noddin, & Campbell, 2008; Benenson, Hodgson, Heath, & Welch, 2008) , facts that are likely related to the greater difficulty that women have in cooperating with people (especially other women) they do not like (Fisher, 1999, pp. 43-44) . In contrast, ostracism by males would be detrimental to the eff ectiveness of their large coalitions organized for warfare or big-game hunting. Female relationships are more egalitarian than those of males, and females are less comfortable with hierarchy than males are (Benenson & Schinazi, 2004) , a tendency that seems to hold true even among military women (Browne, 2007a, pp. 165, 212-213) . Although women value group membership, that is largely because it provides an opportunity to develop and maintain relational attachments, whereas men are more likely to value membership for the collective identity that it provides in addition to the individual relationships that it facilitates (Seeley, Gardner, Pennington, & Gabriel, 2003) . Consistent with the notion that males may be more tightly bound to their groups, men have been found to be less likely than women browne to defect from a group in the presence of intergroup competition in circumstances in which it is more individually benefi cial to leave (Van Vugt & Park, 2010) .
Th ese diff erences in group structure and attachment may have substantial combat implications. Th e military is heavily dependent upon the cohesiveness of combat groups, and fostering the bond among soldiers is one of the primary objects of military training. Th e military structure deemphasizes individualism, and the soldier is "constantly reminded of his responsibilities to his buddies, to his leaders, to the squad, to the platoon, and ultimately to the people and the nation or party through the structure of his immediate unit" (Henderson, 1985, p. 18 ). Men's greater valuing of collective identity would tend to strengthen the bonding of the group, thereby enhancing combat performance.
Cohesion and Combat Groups
It is common today to emphasize the quantitative and technological aspects of war, but it is wrong to think that material factors necessarily determine the outcome of a battle. Th e importance of the "moral factor" in combat has long been recognized. Xenophon observed two and a half millennia ago that "not numbers or strength brings victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them" (Xenophon, 1947, p. 64) . Over 2,000 years later, Napoleon gave voice to the same thought in his famous observation that "in war the moral is to the material as three to one" (Heinl, 1966, p. 196) .
Although a variety of infl uences can be important in motivating men to fi ght, there is a relatively broad consensus among those who have observed and studied the behavior of men in combat-and among those who have been in battle-that they fi ght primarily for their survival, for their immediate comrades, and for their standing in the eyes of those comrades. As Henderson (1985) has noted, "the only force strong enough to make the soldier willing to advance under fi re is his loyalty to the small group and that group's expectations that he will advance" (p. 107). Th e bond that cements this loyalty and holds groups of fi ghting men together is widely viewed by students of the military as critical to combat eff ectiveness. Th is bond, a combination of trust and reciprocal obligation (Ingraham & Manning, 1981) , leads individuals to value the group more than they value themselves and inclines them to further group objectives at substantial peril to themselves. When men lack connection to a bonded group, they are substantially less likely to persevere in the face of adversity (Shils & Janowitz, 1948) .
A striking feature of men's wartime memoirs is the deep emotional connection they had with their comrades, a connection often compared favorably in strength to the male-female bond. Caputo (1977, p. xvii) observed that "the communion between men is as profound as any between lovers." Indeed, it is more so, he says, as "it does not demand for its sustenance the reciprocity, the pledges of aff ection, the endless reassurances required by the love of men and women." Th is bond is paradoxical in that it is simultaneously intense and ephemeral. Unlike the male-female bond, which can endure-though not always easily-long periods of separation, the bond among fi ghting men is transitory, usually lasting only as long as the group is together. Moskos (1970) found, for example, that once a squad member left Vietnam to return home, he seldom contacted those remaining behind and they seldom contacted him (pp. 145-146). Th us, it may be wrong to characterize the bond that cements a cohesive group as "friendship," as some do (MacCoun, Kier, & Belkin, 2006) ; indeed, it is not necessary that all members of the group even like each other.
Despite the US military's current emphasis on diversity, one of the leading contributors to group cohesion is a set of "common attitudes, values, and beliefs" (Henderson, 1985, p. 75) . Th us, psychological homogeneity within a squad is associated with greater combat eff ectiveness (Watson, 1978, pp. 116-117) . Traditionally, part of the shared values for combat troops has been the bond of masculinity (Marlowe, 1983) , a bond that women simply cannot share.
High levels of cohesion are associated with substantial benefi ts both to the individual and the group. Members of cohesive groups express less anxiety about physical dangers (Kellett, 1982, p. 45) , and individuals who have strong group identifi cation can withstand more physical pain (Buss & Portnoy, 1967) . Group cohesion also seems to enhance psychological resilience and protect against PTSD (Brailey, Vasterling, Proctor, Constans, & Friedman, 2007) , and it allows units to cope better with extended periods of sleeplessness in operations (Noy, 1991) . Acts of heroism are also more likely to emerge from highly cohesive units than from less cohesive units (Gal & Gabriel, 1982) . Squads exhibiting high cohesion have also been found to perform at a higher level than other squads (Goodacre, 1953) , though the arrow of causation no doubt points in both directions.
Although the importance of cohesion to military performance has been "a staple of military doctrine for 2500 years" (Manning, 1991, p. 456) , the evidence from social science remains equivocal (Kier, 1998) . As one leading researcher on military cohesion put it, "Th ere is little consensus concerning the who, what, where, when, how, and why of cohesion" (Siebold, 1999, p. 6) . Discussions of cohesion in the literature tend to fall into one of two categories: descriptions of an almost mystical force that is of central importance in combat, and descriptions of a dry sociological construct that is diffi cult to understand, let alone measure, and not obviously related to any particular outcome.
Most sociological and psychological studies on cohesion have been conducted in settings that do not closely mimic the combat environment. Many studies are performed on civilians (often college students), and those that have been conducted on military subjects have concentrated primarily on peacetime tasks. Th ese studies have generally found that "social cohesion"-which is sometimes described as "interpersonal attraction"-is not positively correlated with group performance, while "task cohesion"-shared commitment to achieving goals-is correlated, albeit moderately, with performance (Mullen & Copper, 1994; Rostker, 1993, pp. 291-294) . Th ough no doubt ignorant of these studies, soldiers appear to be aware of the diff erence between these forms of interpersonal relationship, as soldiers in eff ective units often choose diff erent colleagues for combat tasks than they select to accompany on leave (Watson, 1978, p. 114) . However, given the tendency of females to select their friends when picking teams for sports-rather than choosing the best player, as boys do (Evans, 1986) -that same behavior might not be true for women.
One problem with laboratory measures of cohesion is that they may not be capturing the relevant phenomenon (Manning & Fullerton, 1988) . Cohesion is viewed by the military as a "performance enabler" rather than a "performance enhancer" (Griffi th, 2007) . Rather than enhancing technical performance, it correlates with military performance "by maintaining the organized group at its tasks in the face of severe stresses of battle" (Marlowe, 1979 , as cited in Griffi th, 2007 . Because sociological studies of cohesion generally do not take place in particularly stressful conditions, their results may substantially underestimate the importance of cohesion in the primary circumstances in which it really matters.
As the technology of war develops, cohesion becomes more critical but also more diffi cult to achieve. In Napoleon's day, soldiers acted under the close watch of their superiors, standing shoulder to shoulder with their comrades and drawing strength from their presence (Henderson, 1985, p. 107) . Today, however, direct control of troops has become more diffi cult and soldiers operate more independently. Urban warfare, such as that conducted in Iraq, negates some of the technological edge of modern armies and requires dispersal into small groups, magnifying the importance of the individual soldier and his small group. Indeed, according to Scales (2005) , "the isolation inherent in urban fi ghting . . . requires a degree of small-unit cohesion never before seen in the American military" (p. 16).
If men and women are socially interchangeable, then inclusion of women in combat groups should not change this fundamental dynamic. Th ere is strong reason to believe, however, that inclusion of women in groups of men actually does alter group dynamics and quite likely in the direction of reduced cohesion and therefore lesser combat eff ectiveness.
Sexual Integration and Cohesion
Studies of performance of sexually integrated non-combat units suggest that inclusion of women in combat units may disrupt unit cohesion. Rosen et al. (1996) , for example, found a signifi cant negative correlation between cohesion and the percentage of women in a group of junior enlisted personnel, although a subsequent study disclosed no such relationship (Rosen & Martin, 1997) . A review of fi ve separate studies-three on deployments (in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti) and two garrison studies-found in four of the fi ve studies that the more women in the unit, the lower the cohesion (Rosen et al., 1999) . In the deployment studies, the negative impact of women correlated with the extent of physical danger, being most pronounced in Somalia, where the risk of coming under fi re was greatest; only moderate in the Persian Gulf, where the risk was somewhat less; and neutral to mildly positive in Haiti, where the risk was virtually nil.
Th e dynamics of cohesion diff er between the fi eld and garrison, calling into question the generalizability of many of the military cohesion studies to integration of combat units. Increased time in the fi eld tends to be positively correlated with "group hypermasculinity"-defi ned as "expressions browne of extreme, exaggerated, or stereotypic masculine attributes and behaviors"-in both all-male groups and mixed-sex groups (Rosen, Knudson, & Fancher, 2003, p. 326) . In mixed-sex groups, fi eld duty time is associated with decreased acceptance of women, probably because the fi eld environment tends "to emphasize 'warrior' values of toughness, independence, and aggression" (p. 343). In maleonly groups, hypermasculinity is associated with both increased vertical and horizontal cohesion and readiness. Rosen and colleagues have concluded that military eff ectiveness is positively associated with a culture of hypermasculinity and that "ungendered professionalism," which has positive eff ects in the garrison environment, "may be diffi cult to maintain in the fi eld where a warrior culture is likely to develop, a culture that may be necessary for the successful accomplishment of the mission" (p. 345).
Substantial numbers of military men (and women) share the view that inclusion of women impairs cohesion (Presidential Commission, 1992, pp. 29, 66) . Even in the Air Force, the service with the most women, a third of male pilots expressed the view that women should not fl y in combat, their primary concerns being that women would destroy unit cohesion, that they are more emotional and less aggressive than men, and that they are a distraction to male aircrew members (Voge & King, 1997) . A survey at the Air Force Academy almost three decades after its sexual integration found that 40% of cadets, both male and female, believed that physical and psychological diff erences between the sexes mean that women will never be completely accepted in the military, and 20% of male cadets believed that women should not be at the Academy at all (Gray, Smith, & Luedtke, 2004) .
If women tend to decrease the cohesion of combat groups, it is important to understand the mechanism by which this occurs. One major contributor seems to be that it is diffi cult for men to trust women in dangerous circumstances.
Cohesion and Trust
Trust is central to cohesive combat units (Ingraham & Manning, 1981) , as it is to all sorts of relationships. Cottrell, Neuberg, and Li (2007) found that across group types, "trustworthiness" is of paramount value, more important, in fact, than cooperativeness. Interpersonal trust, they suggest, "may be foundational to the development and maintenance of all close relationships" (p. 227). Application of the theory of reciprocal altruism to warfare suggests that "the cohesion of war-making coalitions composed of distantly or unrelated kin will be based on the perceived likelihood or trust that support in confl icts will be reciprocated in the future" (Patton, 2000, p. 421) .
Assessment of the value of peers focuses on both the capacity to provide desirable resources and the likelihood that they will make those resources available (Vigil, 2007) . Th us, combat compatriots must have trust in both their comrades' willingness and their ability to satisfy their obligations. Th e earnest assurance "I've got your back" is a cheap signal that is worth little in the absence of the courage, toughness, and skill to deliver on the promise. Conversely, all the courage and strength in the world are worth little to a soldier's comrades if he lacks the disposition to risk death in support of them. Trust among soldiers "is characterized by the willingness to put oneself at risk because of confi dence that the other person will do what is expected of him or her" (Ruark, Orvis, Horn, & Langkamer, 2009 , p. 1925 . Th us, the concern of military men about sexual integration involves both aspects of trust, as many are concerned that a woman will not have the physical wherewithal to support the mission or her comrades, while others are concerned that a woman would be insuffi ciently aggressive and thus fail to provide the support that a man would (Browne, 2007a) .
Th e need for trust increases with danger, as individuals become increasingly interdependent. Th is tendency may explain the increasing strength of the same-sex preference among boys as their groups roam farther from home (Maccoby, 1998) , as well as male soldiers' preference for male comrades. A soldier's trust in his commander and comrades has been described as "the most important factor for security" (Noy, 1991, p. 518) . Th e especially negative attitudes to sexual integration expressed by soldiers in combat specialties is explainable by this tendency (Browne, 2007a, pp. 148-149) , as may be the cool reception of women in dangerous civilian occupations, such as in police work and fi refi ghting (Browne, 2007a, pp. 284-285) .
Assessment of trustworthiness involves more than passive evaluation. Hazing of new members is common in groups facing danger, and an individual's reaction to hazing aff ects the extent to which he is accepted by the group (Josefowitz & Gadon, 1989) . Women, even military women, are less likely to view hazing as a permissible method of encouraging group cohesion (Pershing, 2006) and, consistent with a pattern that begins in childhood, are more likely to complain to authority fi gures. Th is reaction is typically perceived as disloyal to the group and interferes with the development of trust.
Th ere is reason to believe that men's lack of trust in female comrades has evolutionary roots. Th e decision whether to trust a potential combat compatriot-or a comrade in other dangerous cooperative enterprises, such as big-game hunting-is a consequential one that would have recurred over evolutionary time. Just as indicators of prowess as a warrior and hunter-dominance, strength, and courage-are attractive to women seeking mates (Buss, 1994, pp. 38-40; Farthing, 2007) , they would also be attractive to men seeking coalition partners (Sugiyama, 2005, p. 305) . Men who were as willing to stand shoulder to shoulder in battle or on the hunt with weak and cowardly men-or with women-as they were with strong and brave men would probably have found themselves at a substantial disadvantage. Haselton and Funder (2006) have suggested that "an evolved propensity for accurate personality judgment" would likely have arisen for traits important to survival and reproduction (p. 31). Even many nonhuman species exhibit specifi c biases in partner preferences. According to Dugatkin and Sih (1995, p. 273 ), "we expect partner choice to be more likely to occur in situations where the identity of one's partner has a great eff ect on fi tness." Indeed, they show that in a number of fi sh species, for example, individuals prefer to associate with others who have shown themselves trustworthy in foraging or antipredator behavior, a pattern also observed in chimpanzees (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006) .
In formation of the bonds of cohesion in our evolutionary past, males and females were not interchangeable. Most females would be pregnant, nursing, or caring for children most of the time and therefore would be unable to participate eff ectively in big-game hunting or warfare (Tiger, 1969, pp. 44-45) . Th ose who did would risk the loss of their off spring, born or unborn (Campbell, 1999) . Moreover, men who permitted women to join their ventures would also be at a disadvantage, because women would be less valuable contributors and their presence could disrupt the cooperative nature of the enterprise by engendering competition among the men for sexual access to the women.
Th e cause of men's trust or lack thereof may not be consciously accessible to them. Trust decisions are "fast, shallow, and context-sensitive" (Messick and Kramer, 2001, p. 98) ; that is, they are not the product of systematic processing but instead derive from rules of thumb of which we are largely unaware. Th us, men would be expected to make judgments, even if at a less than conscious level, about whom to trust in combat based on the extent to which the potential comrade displays attributes associated with eff ective warriors in the past, just as men make similarly intuitive assessments of potential mates without making conscious judgments about fertility. In assessing trustworthiness, whether consciously or not, men are likely to be particularly attentive to attributes of potential comrades that pose a threat to the combat unit, including their membership in groups that are perceived as posing such threats, such as women, for whom well-known stereotypes involve weakness and timidity.
Negative feelings about the prospect of female combat comrades do not necessarily refl ect generalized hostility toward women. Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) have shown that rather than being an undifferentiated negative attitude toward a group, prejudice is a more nuanced phenomenon. Th e negative emotion that a particular group elicits turns on the nature of the perceived threat. Th ey suggest that people who are highly dependent upon their groups (as combat soldiers are) are "especially attuned to potential threats to reciprocity," and their vigilance "must be accompanied by psychological responses that function to minimize-or even eliminaterecognized threats and their detrimental eff ects" (p. 771). Th ese results are consistent with the fact that men may simultaneously have positive views of women in noncombat military positions and strongly negative views about their service in combat, as it is in the latter case that women may pose the greatest risk to the group's well-being. Perhaps signifi cantly, female soldiers are even less likely than male soldiers to want to work with women (Rosen et al., 1996; Sion, 2001) .
Th e uncertainty involved in making judgments about whom to trust-decisions that are more intuitive than cognitive-means that these judgments are prone to error, and, according to error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000) , these errors are not likely to be random. Th e decision of whom to trust in coalitions organized to mete out violence is one that is fraught with serious fi tness consequences. Moreover, it is a judgment that likely carries with it asymmetric costs of error. Declining to trust a potential comrade who in fact would have performed well would probably tend, on average, to be less costly than trusting a comrade who performs poorly. One would suppose, then, that the default position is not to trust potential combat comrades. Th at is one of the central reasons that units train browne together-to develop trust-and an initial disposition to distrust is probably the primary reason that it takes time and experience for new members of units to gain the trust of their comrades.
Attributes of Individuals Whom Men Identify as Eff ective Soldiers
As would be predicted, combat soldiers do have strong preferences concerning their comrades, and they do not trust other soldiers, even male ones, indiscriminately. It seems that soldiers somehow pick up on signals from other men indicating their combat capability even if they have not witnessed their combat performance. Immediately after combat in Korea ended in 1953, about 300 men were classifi ed as either "fi ghters" or "nonfi ghters" by their peers, judgments that were validated through independent verifi cations of the combat incidents that served as the basis for the classifi cation (Berkun & Meeland, 1958) . Th ese men were placed in groups of 15 to 18 men each, such that no group member knew any other member of his group. Th ose designated "fi ghters" and "nonfi ghters" were mixed together, but nobody knew about these designations or the purpose of the study. Each group then lived together for a week of psychological testing. At the end of that week, they were asked to identify the two men they would most and least like to have next to them in combat or leading them in combat. Fighters overwhelmingly chose other fi ghters as most suitable, both as combat comrades and leaders, and nonfi ghters chose fi ghters as the most suitable combat leaders. Fighters and nonfi ghters alike identifi ed nonfi ghters as least suitable as comrades and leaders. Th e researchers concluded, "Obviously some observable manifestation correlated with fi ghter status served as the basis for these judgments" (p. 148).
More masculine men are judged by their peers to be more eff ective fi ghters than less masculine men. A study of combat performance in the Korean War found that the fi ve main factors distinguishing good fi ghters were, in decreasing order of importance, leadership, masculinity, intelligence, sense of humor, and emotional stability (Egbert et al., 1957 , as cited in Binkin, 1993 . Th e attributes of eff ective fi ghters ranged from calmness under fi re to "the highest kind of daring and bravery," while the attributes of ineff ective fi ghters included fi ring at imaginary objects, failing to fi re, and running away under fi re (Egbert, 1954) .
Supporting the existence of a male preference for comrades who would have been eff ective hunters or fi ghters is the fi nding that even civilian men have a preference for same-sex friends who are physical risk takers (Farthing, 2005) , as both hunting and warfare often reward the bold (although not necessarily the "overly bold" or reckless) and penalize the timid. Both men and women have a preference for same-sex friends who are willing to take "heroic" physical risks-such as rescuing someone endangered by fi re-although men's preference for such friends is much higher than women's. Even with respect to "nonheroic" risks-such as dangerous sports-men have a preference for risk takers, in contrast to women's preference for same-sex friends who avoid such risks. Th ese tendencies are consistent with the fi nding of Lewis et al. (2011, p. 554) that "friend selection in male-male dyads-even in modern conditions-revolved around characteristics that would have facilitated hunting and warfare in ancestral environments."
Th e long-standing link between warfare and masculinity appears to have hormonal correlates. Gimbel and Booth (1996) found, long after the Vietnam War, a positive correlation between testosterone levels and extent of combat exposure among Vietnam veterans. Th ey found that testosterone had a positive eff ect on assignment to the combat arms, and that among those in the combat arms, it had a positive eff ect on the extent of combat exposure they experienced. Th ese fi ndings suggest that Army assignment policies somehow tended to select more masculine soldiers for combat duty.
Leadership
Beyond the question of women as combat comrades is the question of women combat leaders. Women leading men in combat (or in any other dangerous endeavor) would have been unusual in our evolutionary past, and it is unlikely that male and female psychologies have evolved in ways that make the vertical cohesion between female leader and male follower any more likely-and perhaps even less likely-than the horizontal cohesion that occurs within groups of soldiers. Men's desire for a "man of steel" as a leader (Henderson, 1985, p. 114) would have been adaptive in a time when most combat was face to face and at close range, and it probably remains so today. Men have never faced any adaptive pressure to follow women into battle, so it would not be surprising if male psychology is not designed to make that an easy behavior to evoke.
Th ere is, in fact, good reason to believe that in at least some contexts women may not evoke band of brothers or band of siblings? followership behavior (in either men or women) to the same extent that men do (Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Rice, Bender, & Vitters, 1980) . Even in early childhood, girls fi nd it diffi cult to infl uence boys, and frustration with that lack of infl uence may be a major contributor to the tendency of boys and girls to separate into single-sex groups (Maccoby, 1990) . In the civilian sector, women supervisors are usually trusted less by both men and women, and men and women often prefer male supervisors to female supervisors, with women's preference for a male supervisor often being stronger than men's (Jeanquart- Barone & Sekaran, 1994; Eagly & Karau, 2002) , although the magnitude of the preference for a male boss has diminished somewhat over the last few decades (Eagly, 2007) . Both male and female subordinates have a more negative reaction to the imposition of discipline by female superiors than by male superiors (Atwater, Carey, & Waldman, 2001) .
Studies of leadership emergence and preferences have found substantial sex diff erences, especially in areas that would be relevant to combat leadership. Men tend to emerge more frequently in initially leaderless groups when leadership is defi ned by contribution to the group's task, while women tended to emerge more frequently as "social leaders," although the preference for male task leadership is reduced to the extent that the task is considered "feminine" (Eagly & Karau, 1991) . Even though military groups tend to be the diametric opposite of leaderless given the clearly understood hierarchy of formal rank, leadership can emerge in combat independent of rank when the designated leader is weak (Stouff er et al., 1949, p. 117) . Leadership preferences are condition dependent, with there being a strong preference for male leaders under conditions of intergroup competition (Van Vugt & Spisak, 2008) .
Men and women also often exhibit diff erent leadership styles, a fact that also has implications for combat leadership. Men are more likely to adopt an autocratic or directive style and women to adopt a democratic or participatory style (Eagly & Johnson, 1990 ). Yet, in combat groups, democratic leadership may destroy group solidarity (Shils, 1951) . Although women's tendency to adopt a democratic leadership style is weakened in settings that are highly male dominated, Eagly and Johnson (1990) found that women who adopt an authoritarian style of leadership tend to be devalued as leaders. Although the bulk of studies evaluating the eff ectiveness of leaders have found men and women to be equivalent in their eff ectiveness, military studies (which have been limited to noncombat activities) "deviated strongly from all other classes of studies" (Eagly et al., 1995, p. 135) . Th ese peacetime studies, it should be noted, almost certainly understate the size of sex diff erences related to combat-leadership eff ectiveness.
Both men and women in military training associate male cadets more with leader-like qualities, such as leadership, self-confi dence, dedication, and physical fi tness (Boldry, Wood, & Kashy, 2001) . Even men who hold-or at least profess-egalitarian views, often display visible signs of negative feelings toward female leaders (Rice et al., 1980) . Although experience with being led by female commanders might be supposed to reduce men's sexual stereotyping of military leadership, in fact the opposite seems to occur. A study at the Air Force Academy found that male cadets' seniority and experience with women increased, rather than decreased, masculine stereotyping (Boyce & Herd, 2003) . Peer perceptions of women's lack of military leadership potential have led the service academies to eliminate peer ratings of leadership-despite the fact that peers are often better judges of leadership ability than superiors (Watson, 1978, pp. 160-161 )-because women consistently received lower ratings than men (Mitchell, 1998, p. 63; Rice, Yoder, Adams, Priest, & Prince, 1984) . Because combat leaders must evoke followership under conditions that may result in the death of the follower, the stakes of leadership eff ectiveness are at their peak, and less than full confi dence in the leader can have fatal consequences.
Men's Distrust of Female Comrades May Be Resistant to Change
If the proximate triggers that lead to trust among comrades and in leaders are ones that are associated with men and masculinity, it may be diffi cult to overcome the hurdle of initial distrust of female comrades. Th at is, if men's aversion to women in combat units refl ects an evolved biological predisposition rather than merely being a product of social learning, it may be more resistant to modifi cation than proponents of integration have assumed. Th is would likely be true even if the reasons that selection favored the aversion have disappeared. Th at is, even if it were true that changes in the nature of warfare have made women equally competent comrades and even if women displayed the same leadership behaviors as men, the factors that trigger trust are ones that evolved over the course of evolutionary browne history, not necessarily ones that are predictive of competence today.
Decision-making processes are designed to be attentive to the kinds of information that were available in the environment in which the mind evolved (Haselton & Funder, 2006) . In considering men's resistance to female comrades, an analogy to mate preferences may be instructive. We have no difficulty understanding that a man's sexual attraction to a beautiful 25-year-old known to be infertile is likely to be substantially greater than to a 45-yearold who, with the assistance of modern medicine, possesses the fertility of a 25-year-old notwithstanding her age-appropriate appearance. It is not actual fertility that is the proximate trigger of sexual attraction, but rather possession of visible attributes that have been markers of fertility over evolutionary time. Similarly, good grades at a military academy or impressive performance on a paper-and-pencil personality test-even if they were truly valid predictors of combat capability-are likely to carry far less weight with potential comrades than the indicia of masculinity that have been important over our evolutionary history, such as courage, dominance, and physical capacity. So, even if there is a logical reason for men to trust women, women may not embody the proximal triggers of that trust, meaning that they may not be trusted despite their fi tness for combat.
Men's disinclination to trust female comrades may be easily reinforced by a small amount of adverse experience but not easily extinguished by a lot of good experience. "Biologically prepared" emotions are not only easier to acquire but also harder to extinguish, as experience with biologically prepared fears has shown (Öhman & Mineka, 2001) . Sworn statements from a hundred health inspectors that a taco stand's food is wholesome may not be suffi cient to outweigh the negative experience of food poisoning from one bad taco.
In sum, men seem to be psychologically predisposed not to welcome women into combat groups, and the expectation that they will accommodate may be overly optimistic. Military training, which already presents so many challenges, may face the ultimate challenge if it attempts to undo this tendency, which seemingly has origins deep within men.
Conclusion
Sexual integration of combat forces presents obstacles that may not be obvious to those steeped in the SSSM view of human psychology. Th e assumption that military discipline will overcome all impediments to inclusion of women in combat units may be naive. Th e US military has been plagued by a succession of sex scandals, for example, even when women were not included in most, or any, combat units (Browne, 2007b) . Th e assumption that integration will succeed because "combatants follow orders" (Shields, Curry, & Nichols, 1990, p. 24) neglects the fact that although the military can compel or forbid certain behaviors, it is far more limited in its ability to coerce changes in feelings of its personnel. As one Marine Corps offi cer has noted, "units cannot be ordered to 'be cohesive' " (McBreen, 2002, p. 11) . Similarly, the military cannot force men to trust women or ignore the physical and psychological diff erences between the sexes.
Even if it is accepted that women may undermine combat eff ectiveness, it does not necessarily follow that they should be excluded from combat. Some argue that excluding women from combat on the rationale that they would weaken the military inappropriately elevates the common good of national defense over individual rights (Addis, 1994, pp. 3-4; Peach, 1996, p. 165) . Th at is an argument that science cannot resolve, as it revolves around contestable values. What science can do, however, is provide insights about diffi culties that particular policies may create and, potentially, help guide decision makers in their formulation and implementation of policies, whatever they might be.
Future Directions
A number of issues covered in this chapter could be illuminated with better data:
Laboratory studies of such traits as risk • taking, aggression, and fear tend to reveal smaller sex diff erences than revealed by real-world observations of actual behavior. Ethical constraints on treatment of research subjects obviously preclude too much realism, but it appears that laboratory measures have far to go in capturing phenomena of real-world interest.
Although combat soldiers seem to have • defi nite preferences concerning desirable comrades and are moved to trust some comrades more than others, there is relatively little data on the subject, and much of it dates back to the Korean War or before. Th e large pool of experienced combat soldiers created by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provides an opportunity for further study.
388
band of brothers or band of siblings?
Better data on the eff ect of cohesion on • military performance are needed. Most existing research is aimed at measuring whether cohesion enhances performance outside of the combat arena. Yet, if the function of cohesion is not to act as a global performance enhancer, but rather to enable performance under severe combat stress, the current literature on cohesion does not measure the cohesion-performance relationship where it really matters.
Although women in the US military are not • assigned to ground combat positions, they have recently been exposed to combat, providing an experience base from which some conclusions might be reached. Unfortunately, however, the military has been relatively steadfast in not releasing-and in many cases not even collectingdata that might refl ect on women's performance (Browne, 2007a, pp. 216-217, 220-222) . Despite the fact that large numbers of female military personnel in Iraq were shipped home because of pregnancy, for example, the Army has announced that it was "not tracking" that data (Browne, 2007a, p. 245) . If systematic and objective data on women's performance in combat situations exist, they might shed light on the eff ects of women's integration into combat units.
